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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the
applicability of existing American obscenity law, based on
local community standards, to the problem of policing
obscenity in cyberspace.
Additionally, this paper critiques recent attempts to
regulate obscenity in cyberspace and suggests alternatives
which would allow constitutional and consistent regulation
of obscenity on-line.
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CENSORSHIP, CYBERSPACE, AND COMMUNITY STANDARDS
AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ON-LINE OBSCENITY

Introduction
"[0]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric"
- Justice John Harlan1
Rapidly changing technologies have required that
American laws evolve and expand to include new areas of
conflict within their scope.2

Technology is like a

frontier in that it is an area where old ideas, laws, and
societal mores conflict with the realities of completely new

xCohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
2For example, the expansive use of telephones, cable
television, and both radio and television broadcasting have
created unique challenges for lawmakers and legal
commentators alike.

See, e.g.. Nicholas P. Miller & Joseph

Van Eaton, A Review of Developments in Cases Defining the
Scope of the First Amendment Rights of Cable Television
Operators, 3 80 PLI/Pat 885 (March-April 1994);
Nudelman, A Chilly Wait in Radioland:

Steven

The FCC Forces

"Indecent" Radio Broadcasters to Censor Themselves of Face
the Music. 2 J.L. & Pol'y 115 (1994);
Recent Development;

Jeffrey L. Reed,

Constitutional Law - First Amendment

Protected for Indecent Speech - Dial-A-Porn. 57 Tenn. L.
Rev. 339, 363

(1989).
2

3
and different situations.
technological frontier.4

Cyberspace3 is such a
Accordingly, it has been hailed

3,1Cyber space" is a term which recently entered popular
use to refer to the spatially undefinable area where
electronic communications take place.

See generally Edward

J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum?

Computer

Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 Geo. L.J.
409

(1992).
4The Internet, "a worldwide interlinked network of

computers born in 1969 as ARPANET under the auspices of the
U.S. Department of Defense," Kim Neely, Caught In The N e t .
Rolling Stone, December 1, 1994, at 63, was for nearly
twenty years used primarily by military and university
computer experts, as well as "a core group of computer elite
- scientists, programmers, and hackers."

Id.

In recent

years, the advent of commercial computer services like
America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe have opened the
Internet to anyone with access to a computer and a modem.
For some commentary on the subject of other developing
legal issues on the Internet, see I. Trotter Hardy, The
Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace". 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
993 (1994)

(discussing the appropriate legal regime for

"cyberspace";

Rosalind Resnick, Cvbertort;

The New Era;

The Rush to Use the Internet has Spawned a Host of Court
Battles and a New Practice Area, The Nat'l L.J., Al, col. 2,
July 18, 1994 (discussing on-line libel cases from 1991 to

4
as the only form of media where a truly free exchange of
ideas and commentary can exist.5

Such an exchange

the present, summarizing on-line trademark and contract
litigation);

Daniel Waggoner, Potholes on the "Information

Superhighway". Practicing Law Institute:

Patents,

Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series, PLI Order No. G4-3918, March-April 1994.
5See M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and
Technological Change:

The New Media Have a Message. 57 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1459, 1481 (1989)

(describes how electronic

communication promotes self-fulfillment);
An Electronic Soapbox:

Eric C. Jensen,

Computer Bulletin Boards and the

First Amendment. 39 Fed. Comm. L.J. 217, 224 (1987);

Gina

M. Garramone et a l ., Uses of Political Bulletin Boards. 3 0
J. of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 325, 329 (1986);
Robert 0'Harrow, Jr., Computer-Friendly Homes Increasing:
Electronic Bulletin Boards Provide Many Residents with
Comfort. Communication. Wash. Post., Dec. 27, 1992, at Bl;
Jammy Scott, On-Line, and Mavbe Out of Line, L.A. Times,
Sept. 24, 1993, at Al (discussing the blunt forms on-line
communication can take because of the relative anonymity of
its users).

All of the above are cited in Eric Schlatchter,

Cyberspace, The Free Market, and the Free Marketplace of
Ideas:

Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin

Board Functions. 16 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 87 (1993) .
See also David Landis, Sex, laws & cvberspace/Regulating
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includes, however, the exchange of thoughts and materials
that many consider obscene.6
Many users of on-line systems argue that whether or
not materials are obscene depends upon the perspective of
the beholder.

They agree with Justice Harlan's comment

that, "it is largely because government officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to
the individual.1,7
This paper will examine the applicability of existing
American obscenity law, based on local community standards,
to the problem of policing obscenity on the Internet, an
international computer network which embraces people from
innumerable communities.

Part I of this paper gives a brief

history of obscenity law in the United States.

Part II

discusses modern applications of community standards with
regard to obscenity in different media.

Part III explores

the impact of the first on-line obscenity case and then
investigates the debate on whether cyberspace should be
treated as public or private space.

Part IV discusses the

inadequacy of recent on-line obscenity legislation, which is
porn;

Does it cjompute?,

USA Today, August 9, 1994 at p. ID

6See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 83 9 F.
Supp 1552

(M.D. Fla. 1993);

Joel Garreau, Bawdy Bvtes;

The

Growing World of Cvbersex, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1993, at A l .
7Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).

6
almost certainly unconstitutional, and asks how we can both
constitutionally and consistently limit the exchange of
otherwise protected communications in cyberspace.

A Brief History of Obscenity Laws in the United States
Obscenity is a concept that Americans have found
"notoriously difficult to define,"8 to the extent that even
the Supreme Court has yet to arrive at a truly satisfactory
description of what constitutes "obscenity."9

This

frustration is probably best embodied by Justice Potter
Stewart's famous comment:

"[I] know it [obscenity] when I

8Donovan W. Gaede, Constitutional Law -- Policing the
Obscene:

Modern Obscenity Doctrine Re-evaluated, 18 S. 111.

U. L. J. 43 9.

Justice Harlan wrote in Ginsberg v. New York,

390 U.S. 67 6, 704-5

(1968)

(Harlan, J., concurring),

that no

other subject has produced a greater variety of views among
members of the United States Supreme Court than obscenity.
Ginsberg. 390 U.S. at 704-5;

Joseph T. Clarke, The

"Community Standard" in the Trail of Obscenity Cases - A
Mandate for Tgmp-i -r-ical Evidence in Search of the Truth. 2 0
Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 13, at 13 and fns. 1 & 2.

In thirteen

1960s cases, there were fifty-five separate opinions written
by the nine Justices.

Id.

9See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda,
Law, §16.59-61 (4th ed. 1991).
7

Constitutional
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see it."10
The Comstock Acts
Obscenity laws first appeared in America in the 187 0s
when moral purity movements "link[ed] birth control to
obscenity in the atmosphere surrounding the family in the
Victorian United States."11

A New Yorker named Anthony

Comstock was behind the reform effort;

with the assistance

of Vice President Henry Wilson and Supreme Court Justice
William Strong, he drafted the first national obscenity
statute.12

The Comstock Act became law on March 1, 1873.

The language of the Act makes it clear that Comstock
had no qualms about legislating morality.

The Act

prohibited the "circulation and importation of obscene
materials" through the U.S. mails, as well as banning all
items designed "for preventing contraception or producing
abortion."13

Violators were to be punished severely --

with a $5000 fine, a sentence of one to ten years hard
labor, or both.

Many states also passed their own versions,

called "Little Comstock Acts."14
10Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197

(1964)

(Stewart, J., concurring).
i:LKermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror:
History (1989) at 161.
12Id.
13Id.
14Id.

Law and American
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The Hicklin Test
Until 1957, the test for obscenity in other forms was
taken from the 1868 British case of Regina v. Hicklin.15
The Hicklin test for obscenity was based on the effects of
certain paragraphs in a written pamphlet upon "particularly
susceptible persons."16

The test found materials obscene

if "the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall."17

This test, based on the effects

obscenity could have on its audience, remained the law in
the United States for nearly one hundred years.18
1SL.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), as discussed in P. Heath
Brockwell, Grappling with Miller v. California:

The Search

for an Alternative Approach to Regulating Obscenity. 24
Cumb. L. Rev. 131 (1993-94).

Brockwell suggests that Regina

v. Hicklin finds its basis in Sydlyes Case, 83 Eng. Rep.
1146

(1663), considered the first reported Western obscenity

case.

See also the discussion of the Hicklin test in Gaede,

supra note 8.
16Gaede, supra note 8.
17Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 at 371 (1868) .
18See, generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
Commissioner of Education of New York, et. al., 343 U.S. 495
(1952);

Dennis et. al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494

(1951);

Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);

Winters
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The Hicklin Test Repudiated, and the Creation of "Community
Standards11
The Hicklin test was explicitly repudiated in the 1957
Supreme Court decision Roth v. United States.19

Roth

involved the case of a bookseller convicted for mailing
obscene materials in violation of an existing federal
statute.20

The Supreme Court upheld Roth's conviction and

articulated, for the first time, a legal definition of
obscenity21 which clearly placed it outside of the First
Amendment's free speech protections.22
The Roth opinion states that "obscene material is
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest."23

Roth went on to clarify how courts

were to identify what was legally obscene by determining if
"to the average person, applying contemporary community
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948);

Hannegan, Postmaster

General v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946);
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
U.S. 311 (1897);

Martin v.

Chaplinksy v. New

Price v. United States, 165

Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29

(1896) .
19354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
20Id. at 480.
21Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
22See U.S. Const., amend. I .
23Roth, 354 U.S. 476 at 487

(footnote omitted).

standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest."24

This test was

based on the idea that individual geographic placement
determined how Americans determined what constituted
obscenity.25
The Justices, however, were not specific about what
exactly the phrase "community standards" meant;
consequently, the Supreme Court often found itself
attempting to clarify its holding in the years immediately
following Roth.26

Some Justices maintained that

"contemporary community standards" really referred to some
sort of national American standard.27

Others preferred use

of a national standard only for federal prosecutions.28
Miller v. California and the Modern Test for Obscenity
The legal wrangling over the vagueness of Roth
24Id. at 489.
25Id.
26Eg.. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 37 0 U.S. 478,
488, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 8 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1962);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95, 84 S. Ct. 1676,
1680-82, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793

(1964);

Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399

U.S. 524, 90 S. Ct. 2241, 26 L. Ed. 782 (1970).
27Jacobellis. 378 U.S. 184, 192-95

(1964)

(Brennan, J.

joined by Goldberg, J.).
28Manual Enterprises. 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962)
J., joined by Stewart, J.).

(Harlan
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convinced the Court that it must articulate a clearer test
for use on potentially obscene materials.29

A new three-

part test for obscenity was promulgated in the 1973 case,
Miller v. California.30

In Miller, the Court stated that

materials in question must be viewed according to whether:
(a) "the average person, applying 'contemporary
community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest"31;
(b) "the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined .
by the applicable state law"32;
and (c) "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."33
The Court stated that a national obscenity
standard was unacceptable to the nation and would be
impossible to administer:
[0]ur Nation is simply too big and too
diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that
such standards could be articulated for all fifty
states in a single formulation34 . . . [To]
require a State to structure obscenity proceedings
around evidence of a national "community standard"
would be an exercise in futility35 . . . [I]t is
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to
29See Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9 at §16.60,
discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) .
30413 U.S. 15 (1973) .
31Id. at 24.
32Id.
33Id. .
34Miller, 413 U.S. 15 at 23 (1973).
35Id. at 24.
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read the First Amendment as requiring that the
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas,
or New York City."36
Although Chief Justice Burger argued the practical
difficulties of determining a single national standard, he
ignored the even more immense logistical nightmare that the
formulation and application of local obscenity standards
created for the courts.

What constitutes obscenity in one

part of the country - or one part of the county - could be
perfectly legal and acceptable in another.37

But Burger,

like Chief Justice Warren before him, clearly indicated in
Miller that the "community standards" doctrine means that
standards for acceptable levels of obscenity are to be set
at the local level.38
today.39

This remains the law of the land

Generally, legal definitions of "obscenity" are

36Id. at 32.
37Id. at 24.
38The Miller test gives "community standards" a more
literal meaning than in the Roth decision by explicitly
delegating to the jury the determination of what constitutes
obscenity:

"[I]n resolving the inevitable sensitive

questions of fact and law, we must continue to rely on the
jury system . . . ."

Miller, 413 U.S. at 26 (1973)

(quoted

in Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9).
39See, e.g. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 464, 470 (1994);

Rhoden v. Morgan, 863 F. Supp.
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narrow, describing what most Americans would consider "hard
core pornographic expression.1,40

612, 617-18 (1994);
561 (1994)

United States v. Caver, 41 M.J. 556,

(all citing the Miller test the current standard

for defining obscenity for First Amendment purposes).
40Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech In An Open Society
(1992) at 324-25.

M o d e m Applications of Community Standards
While technology has changed the way we communicate,41
it has not altered how we evaluate obscenity,42 which
receives no First Amendment protection because of its
content, regardless of the medium by which it is
communicated.43

Eventually, any legal debate about

regulating obscenity in cyberspace reaches the point where
one must confront the stone wall of community standards.
Although we live in an age where modernization arguably
tends to destroy all that is purely local in any community,
due to the dominance of influences that originate from
outside the locality, the community standards doctrine
41For example, within the past five years, the
electronic bulletin boards of the Internet have "become a
favorite stomping ground for millions of people."
supra note 4 at 63.

Neely,

There are approximately 45,000 such

bulletin boards, being used by "literally millions of
people."

Computer Porn A Prosecutorial challenge;

Cyberspace Smut Easy to Distribute. Difficult to Track, Open
to Legal Questions. ABA Journal, December 1994, at 40.
42See recent cases discussed supra note 39.
43See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
930 (2d ed. 1988) .
15

16
applies to every mode of communication.44

One legal

scholar has concluded that the multimedia revolution which
created "cyberspace" will likely stretch our "legal
creativity" to the limit, but notes that the First Amendment
has accommodated new technologies before and will likely be
able to do so again.45
The Message in the Medium
The development of new technologies has resulted in a
hierarchy of First Amendment applications to differentiate
between electronic and print media.46

The Supreme Court

has stated that "differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them. "47

This hierarchical approach has been

explained by the intrusive nature of certain media like
radio, telephone solicitation, and broadcast television.48
Thus, the nature of the Internet's technological structure
44See. e.g.. Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)

(dial-a-porn);

FCC v. Pacifica

Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), rehearing denied 439 U.S.
883

(197 8)

(radio broadcasting).

45Waggoner, supra note 4.
46The Message in the Medium, 107 Harvard I*. Rev. 1062
(1994) .
47Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 3 95 U.S. 3 67, 3 86
(1969) .
48See. e.g. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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is likely to color any future determination by the Court of
what constitutes obscenity in electronic media. 49

The

question of what form# if any, censorship of cyberspace
should take is complicated by the fact that it combines
elements of print, broadcast, and telephone media.

How

obscenity has been dealt with in those contexts can
illuminate how it should be regulated in cyberspace.
Print Media
The Court ruled in Kaplan v. California50 that although
"a book seems to have a different and preferred place in our
hierarchy of values,"51 books could be found obscene by the
content of their words alone.52

The Court also found that

the contemporary community standards were the appropriate
49The question of what form censorship, if it is to be
applied to the Internet, should take is complicated by the
fact that a fundamental question about the nature of
interactive media has yet to be resolved:

should it be

regulated like other forms of mass communication? See John
F. Dickerson & Douglas Root, Censoring Cyberspace:

Carnegie

Mellon7s Attempt to Ban Sex From Its Campus Computer Network
Sends A Chill Along the Info Highway, Newsweek, November 21,
1994, 102, 103.
50413 U.S. 115, 116 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S.
883 (1973) .
51Id. at 119.
52Id.
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means by which to determine what constituted an obscene
b o o k .53
Courts have not, however, required bookstores, as
"secondary distributors of information,1,54 to be familiar
with the contents of every title they stock55 in order to
keep clear of local obscenity ordinances.

Additionally,

prior restraints on other forms of print media, generally
disfavored by the Court,56 are.often upheld in obscenity
cases, although censoring authorities must first meet
stringent requirements and have the determination of
obscenity made by a local court.57
53Id. at 121.

Kaplan, id. at 115, was decided after

but during the same term as Miller. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) .
54Message, supra note 46 at 1067.

Computers also fit

into this category if one considers their functions as
"bulletin boards" and information services.

The analogy is

particularly apt when applied to information downloaded from
databases:

games, journals, images, etc.

Id.

55In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the
Court held that the First Amendment prohibits prosecution of
a bookseller unless he or she has "knowledge of the contents
of the book."

Id. at 153.

56See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) .
57In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the
Court required a local censorship board attempting to revoke

19
Broadcast Radio and Television
Broadcast radio and television stations are regulated by
the Federal Communications Commission,58 which controls59

the license of a book and motion-picture distributor's to
follow certain specific procedural safeguards before they
could "engage in the prior restraint of allegedly obscene
materials."

Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9, at §16.61 (c).

The Court required that the censoring body:
(1)Afford the accused part a prompt hearing,
(2)Has the burden of showing that the material is,
in fact, obscene,
(3)Must defer to a judicial proceeding for the
imposition of a valid prior restraint on the
material, and
(4)Must either refrain from making a finding of
obscenity, or, as a requirement of law under the
board's enabling statute or clear judicial
mandate, take action on its own behalf in a court
of law to seek an affirmation of its initial
finding of obscenity.
Id.

Nowak and Rotunda note that it is unlikely that this rule on
prior restraints would apply if only books were involved.
Id. at fn 27.
58See. e.g.. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (a)

(1988)(granting FCC

the right to license radio and television operators due to
the limited number of frequencies available on the
electromagnetic spectrum used for broadcasting).
59The FCC cannot, however, engage in "censorship."
U.S.C.A. § 326.

47

Another statutory provision, however,

requires the Commission to prohibit "obscene, indecent, or

20
what can be broadcast over public airwaves.

Most Supreme

Court decisions in this area evince the Court's concern
about broadcast's unique pervasiveness and its accessibility
to children.60

In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,61 the Court

upheld the Commission's ban on obscene speech, while
allowing the Commission only a limited right to regulate
"indecent" speech.
Obscene broadcasts are prohibited by the FCC's enabling
act,62 but it offers no definition of obscenity more
specific than Miller for the purposes of broadcast
regulation.63

The FCC set a clearer standard for cable

profane" broadcasts.
U.S. 726

18 U.S.C.A. § 1464.

Pacifica, 438

(1978), resolved this apparent conflict.

declared that:

The Court

" [S]ection 326 does not limit the FCC's

authority to sanction licensees who engage in obscene,
indecent, or profane broadcasting.

Though the censorship

ban precludes editing proposed broadcasts in advance, the
ban does not deny the FCC the power to review the content of
completed broadcasts."

Id.

60438 U.S at 749.
61438 U.S. 726 (1978), rehearing denied 439 U.S. 883
(1978) .
6218 U.S.C.A. § 1464.
63Perhaps because the FCC is not supposed to engage in
censorship.

See supra note 59.
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television in 1992,64 specifically advising local cable
operators to base their programming around the Miller
s tandard."65
Telephone
The emergence of the dial-a-porn industry resulted in
litigation to clarify how obscenity law would apply to
possibly obscene telephone transmissions.

Telephones, like

computer systems, are "designed for point-to-point,
interactive communication,11 unlike cable television or
broadcasting.66

In fact, the computer systems which create

cyberspace use telephone wires to make their transmissions
through modems.

g4See Miller and Van Eaton, supra note 2 (discussion of
the 1992 Cable Act and its amendments);

Krattenmaker and

Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs;

The New

Morality Meets the New Media. 51 Ford. L. Rev. 606 (1983)
(discussion of pre-Cable Act attempts at regulation).
The appropriate obscenity standard for direct-broadcast
satellite television is also problematic.

See John V.

Edwards, Obscenity in the Age of Direct Broadcast Satellite;
A Final Burial For Stanley v. Georgia (?). A National
Obscenity Standard, and Other Miscellany, 33 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 949 (1992).
655 8 Fed. Reg. 19623

(1993) at 19624.

“Message, supra note 46 at 1065.
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The holding of Sable Communications v . FCC,67 required
the dial-a-porn industry to adhere to local community
standards, tailoring its messages to meet a variety of local
obscenity ordinances.68

The Sable decision makes two

points about the FCC's ability to regulate the dial-a-porn
industry through Section 223

(b) of the Communications Act

of 1934, which bans indecent, as well as obscene, interstate
commercial messages.69

First, § 223 (b) "does not

unconstitutionally prohibit the interstate transmission of
obscene commercial telephone message" because obscenity
receives no First Amendment protection.70

However, the

FCC's "ban on indecent telephone messages violates the First
Amendment since the statute's denial of adult access to such
messages far exceeds that which is necessary to serve the
compelling interests of preventing minors from being exposed
to the messages."71
Justice White, writing for the Court, distinguished
Pacifica's grant of power to regulate indecent radio
broadcasts, noting that Pacifica did not involve a total ban
67492 U.S. 115 (1989),

(striking down congressional ban

on obscene telephone messages).
68Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
Reed, supra note 2 at 363.
694 92 U.S. 115 (1989) .
70Id.
71Id.

See also Jeffrey L.
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on indecent material and relied on the pervasiveness of
broadcasting,

"which can intrude on the privacy of the home

without prior warning of content and which is uniquely
accessible to children.1,72

Moreover, the opinion contrasts

radio with dial-a-porn, which requires the "listener to take
affirmative steps to receive the communications."73

The

distinction drawn between the type of media involved in the
two cases indicates that obscenity and indecency regulation
in cyberspace could also be affected by the need of computer
users to first take "affirmative steps" before they can act
within cyberspace.

The Sable court's position on obscenity

and indecency suggests that in cyberspace, an Internet
user's indecent speech should receive First Amendment
protection.

However, whether that speech is indecent or

obscene will be determined by the community standards of the
user's locality.
Also, as Sable dealt with the prosecution of the
producer of the messages, the Court largely ignored the
intriguing question of the appropriateness of regulating
common carrier telephone companies, which are required to
ignore the content of the private messages their wires
transmit.74

As communication in cyberspace ultimately

72Id.
73Id.
74See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)
1934), and 47 C.F.R. § 21.2

(1988) (Communications Act of
(1992).

See Message, supra
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occurs through telephone wires, it would follow that private
computer-generated communications should also be free of
regulatory interference.

Although computer networks have

not been designated as such, they appear to meet the Supreme
Court's definition of "common carriers":
A common-carrier service in the communications
context is one that "makes a public offering to
provide [communication facilities] whereby all
members of the public who choose to employ such
facilities may communicate or transmit
intelligence of their own design and choosing."75
Sable, however, implies that indecent transmissions over
telephone wires for commercial gain can indeed be regulated
at their source.

In cyberspace, this could mean that

electronic mail and chat rooms might be free from any
regulation, whereas commercial enterprises based on
electronic bulletin boards could be censored.

note 46 at 1065.
75Message, supra note 46 at 1066, quoting FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979)
omitted).

(footnote

Cyberspace:

Public or Private?

In July 1994, the Miller test was applied in the very
first case involving the transmission of obscene images via
the Internet.76

The outcome of that case reveals that

community standards do little to clarify what is and what is
not obscene for the purposes of interlinked computer
networks, and raises a very important question:

is

cyberspace a public area or a private one?
The Case of United States v. Thomas77
In July 1994, a California couple engaged in a
profitable home business was found guilty of violating
Memphis, Tennessee's local obscenity standards by
transmission of obscene images through interstate phone
lines.

Robert and Carleen Thomas were charged with

violations of Memphis' community standards for obscenity
when an undercover federal agent posed as a subscriber to
their members-only78 electronic bulletin board,79 Amateur
76United States v. Thomas, No. 94-2 0019 (W.D. TN)

(July

28, 1994).
77Thomas, No. 94-20019

(W.D. TN July 28, 1994).

78Members could subscribe to the bulletin board for $55
for six months, $99 for a year.

Associated Press, Computer

Porn Trial Breaking New Ground '73 Community Standards
25
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Action.80

Subscribers could use credit cards to download

scenes of sexual fetishes, including bestiality.81
The scenes the Thomases sent to Memphis were not
considered obscene by their own local California
standards.82

Prosecutors, however, felt that the fact that

the images were obscene by Memphis standards was enough of a
violation to justify bringing federal charges83 of
Ruling May fc»et stern Test, Fla. Sun Sentinel, Palm Beach
edition, July 21, 1994, at 4A.
79Electronic bulletin boards

(or "newsgroups") are

publicly accessible and their current numbers are estimated
between 50,00-100,000 in the United States.

They include an

enormous array of subjects, and "most are established by
hobbyists and consist of a single computer and phone line.
Some are profitable businesses with hundreds of thousands of
subscribers.

Callers, dialing in via computer, can post and

read messages and retrieve files consisting of text, images
or computer software."

Landis, supra note 5.

80Thomas, No. 94-20019

(W.D. TN, July 28, 1994).

81Id.
82Robert Thomas has been quoted as saying:

"Everything

I have on my bulletin board can be purchased on the street
in San Francisco."

Computer Porn, supra note 41.

83See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1465, 1466
provides in part that:

(1994).

§ 1466 (a)

" [W]hoever is engaged in the

business of selling or transferring obscene matter,

. . .,
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transmitting obscenity through interstate telephone
lines.84

A Memphis jury convicted the Thomases on eleven

counts of obscenity violations, and sentenced Robert and
Carleen Thomas to 3 6 and 3 0 months in jail, respectively.85
Their conviction was recently upheld by a federal appellate
court.86
The appellate court's opinion is extremely limiting.
Judge Nancy Edmunds, writing for the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, rejected the Thomases' argument that Congress did
not intend for 18 U.S.C. § 1465 to regulate intangible
objects like computer transmissions;

the court also

rejected their assertion that the Congressional intent not
to regulate computer transmissions is evinced by the lack of
an express prohibition of such conduct in the statute.87
The opinion holds that the images were tangible at both
their source and their destination, and are therefore

which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce, shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than 5 years or by a fine under this title, or both."
Id.
84Thomas, No. 94-20019

(W.D. TN, July 28, 1994).

85Id.
86United States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 7 01, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
87Id. at *7.
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tangible images for the purpose of federal regulation.88
In addition, the court points out that their duty to
interpret federal statutes is to "construe the language so
as to give effect to the intent of Congress, "89 which they
found here to be the prevention of interstate transmission
of obscene materials by any and all means.90
The Thomas ruling, which holds operators of electronic
bulletin boards to the community standards of any locality,
actually subverts completely the entire rationale of
community standards, which was to allow communities to set
their own levels of "acceptable" obscenity.
occurred in the Thomas case:

The opposite

Californians, selling

88Id. at *11.
89Id. at *12 (quoting United States v. Underhill, 813
F. 2d 105, 111 (6th Cir.), cert, denied. 482 U.S. 906 (1987)
(quoting United States v. American Trucking Associations,
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-44
90Id. at *14.

(1940)).

To support this conclusion, the court

cited a military case where it was held that § 1465's
silence as to computer transmissions was irrelevant, because
"it is clear Congress intended to stem the transportation of
obscene material in interstate commerce regardless of the
means used to effect that end."

Id., quoting United States

v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 1995 WL 259269
1995) at *10.

(A.F . Ct. Crim. App.
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pornography deemed not obscene by their own community,91
were held to the dictates of communities in Tennessee, who
did consider the pornography obscene.92
This is an especially worrisome development in the
context of the Internet, because operators of bulletin
boards usually cannot screen out calls from any one
locality,93 essentially leaving their operators subject to
the obscenity laws of every community in America.94

Even

if operators could prevent callers from areas where the
material sought would be obscene, they are still obligated
91Much pornography is not legally obscene.

Plavbov and

Penthouse, for example, display "soft-core" pornography
which is rarely, if ever, found to be legally obscene.
Godwin, Problems Policing Porn On-Line:

Mike

Community Standards

Difficult to A d d Iv in Cvbersoace. The San Francisco
Examiner, August 14, 1994.
92Thomas. No. 94-20019

(W.D. TN, July 28, 1994) .

93Distributors of books, magazines, and videos which
may be obscene can avoid shipping to areas where they could
face prosecution.

Operators of bulletin board systems, who

use telephone lines, cannot control from whom who they
receive calls.

Landis, supra note 5.

94For a general discussion of legal issues affecting
operators of computer information systems, see David Loundy,
E-Law;

Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems

and System Operator Liability. 12 Computer L.J. 101 (1993).

30
to know every local obscenity law in the country.

Although

it has been posited that in the future, operators of
electronic networks will resemble telephone companies in
that they will be considered "conduits more than
editors,"95 the Thomas case suggests that at present,
operators of electronic bulletin boards will be held to the
standards of editors who review and are responsible for
every word or image in their form of media.96
Do Electronic Transmissions "Pollute" an Electronic
Community?
The Thomas decision seems even more unfair when one
considers that the Supreme Court has upheld the right to
possess pornography in the privacy of one's home.

Writing

for the Court in Stanley v, Georgia,97 Justice Thurgood
95Message, supra note 46 at 1084.

See also id. at

1088-98 for an in-depth discussion of the future of all
First Amendment regulation on the information superhighway.
96Thomas, No. 94-20019
97394 U.S. 557 (1969).

(W.D. TN, July 28, 1994).
Pornography depicting children,

however, receives no First Amendment protection under any
circumstances if states choose to criminalize even its
private possession.

Osborne, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). See David

B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated Child
Pornography Can be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 Alb. L.J.
Sci. & Tech. 311 (1994) for a discussion of the problematic
nature of computer-generated obscene images, with particular
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Marshall stated:

" [i]£ the First Amendment means anything,

it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films
he may watch."98

However, the Court has construed that

holding very narrowly.

Although commentators have observed

that "one may enjoy obscene material in one's own home,

...

virtually any process that leads to such possession may be
declared illegal,"99 implying that the business o£
obscenity necessarily "pollutes" a community.100
However, in the context of cyberspace, purchasers of
pornography have it transmitted directly to their home
computers.

As they must log on or subscribe to a service,

potentially obscene materials do not interact with either
the cyberspace community or the purchaser's physical
emphasis on those involving the depiction of children.
98Id. at 565.
"Nowak and Rotunda, supra note 9 at § 16.61 (a).
100United States v. Orita, 413 U.S. 139 (1978)
(transporting obscene material for eventual private use in
the home);

United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971)

(receipt of obscene materials through the mails);

Paris

Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), rehearing
denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973), on remand 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.
2d 456

(1973), certiorari denied, 418 U.S. 939 (1974),

rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 887 (1974)
obscene materials).

(voluntarily seeking
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surroundings.

The transaction is completely private;

only

those persons who have sought out such materials receive
exposure to them.

The Thomases' ostensible "polluting" took

place during the split-second transmission of their images
to Tennessee -- a transmission initiated not by them, but by
the undercover agent in Memphis.
As one First Amendment lawyer has pointed out,
"electronic material travels invisibly from one computer to
another,"101 and "in electronic ether ... with the
exception of electrons moving at the speed of light, there
is no community interface.1,102

Mike Godwin, attorney for

the Electronic Freedom Foundation, has argued that
"pornography inevitably finds its way into any new
technology and that since computer networks come directly
into the home, they may have a much less intrusive impact on
communities than older methods of pornography
distribution. "103
On-Line Business On the Line
Although the debate about distribution highlights
cyberspace as a private area, pornography is ultimately a

101Landis, supra note 5.
102See Landis, supra note 5.
103A11 Things Considered;

Couple Found Guilty of

Selling Pornography on Internet (National Public Radio
broadcast, July 29, 1994)(Transcript #1558-4).

33
money-making venture, especially in electronic media,104
and such businesses are generally considered within the
public realm.

Many operators are choosing to limit business

activities which are perfectly legal in their own
communities, hoping that self-censorship will ward off
obscenity prosecutions where their product is illegal.
Community standards' potential chilling effect on business
was a concern first expressed by Justice William Brennan
thirty years prior to U.S. v. Thomas.

In 1964, he wrote

that applying local standards to obscene materials meant
that dissemination of such materials might be curtailed
because sellers would be unwilling to risk convictions under

104Although exact estimates on the number of sexually
explicit electronic bulletin boards vary, the July 1994
compilation of the most "trafficked" discussion groups
listed three sexually-oriented ones in its top ten:
a l t .sex.stories., alt.binaries.pictures.erotica, and
alt.sex.

Landis, supra note 5.

2 00,000 readers in July 1994.

Each group had more than
Id.

Some have remarked on studies which identify 90% of on 
line system users as unmarried white men between the ages of
21 and 30 and posited that the prominence of sex-oriented
bulletin boards will continue until women users are a more
palpable presence in cyberspace.

See Fran Maier,

Women,Not@CvberWorld. Wash. Post, April 16, 1995 at Cl.
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varying obscenity standards depending upon the locale.105
Additionally, Justice Brennan was concerned with
arbitrary enforcement of community standards, given that
some states zealously prosecute obscenity violations while
others are far more lenient on possible offenders.106
105Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 193-195

In

(1964)

(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Goldberg, J.).
106Of particular relevance to the issue of possible
vigorous prosecution of offenses is a state's initial
definition of obscenity.

Although most are based on the

Miller standard, they vary widely from state to state.
e.cr.. Cal. Penal Code § 311 (Deering 1995);
ch. 38, para. 11-20 (1994);
(Burns 1994);

Ann. § 28.579 (365)
8-201 (1994);

111. Rev. Stat.

Ind. Code Ann. § 35-49-1-1

Kan. Stat. A n n . § 21-4301 (c)(1994);

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91.11 (A)

(3)

(West 1993);

(Callaghan 1993);

La.

Mich. Stat.

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-01 (1993);

Cons. Stat. § 5903

(B)

See,

(1994);

Pa.

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-372

(Michie 1994) .
Some states, however, have limited the rights of
localities to further regulate obscenity.
Stat. Ann. § 2 8.579 (370)
laws);

See, e.g., Mich.

(allows exemption for zoning

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-12

(1993).

Other states

have acted affirmatively to allow their municipalities to
regulate obscenity further than the state itself.
e.g..

Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4301 (f)

(3)

(1994);

See,
La. Rev.
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fact, the Thomas' lawyer/ unsuccessfully argued before the
trial that federal prosecutors had shopped around for an
area traditionally conservative on obscenity issues and
generally "computer-illiterate, 1,107 in order to make their
case against the Thomases as strong as possible.108
The Problem of Juvenile Access
Although concern over children's potential exposure to
obscenity has been a major factor in the efforts to regulate
cyberspace, children are not exposed to on-line obscenity
the moment they turn on the family computer.

Like Playboy,

computer-generated obscenity must be subscribed to, or
purchased item by item.

Cyberspace users with no wish to

view obscene images simply do not subscribe to bulletin
boards which specialize in them.

Accordingly, the danger to

children generally results from their own curiosity.
As such, the problem of juvenile access can be dealt
with through the use of parental control, either by direct
supervision of their children's computer time, or through
use of software devices that would allow them to block out
Stat. Ann. § 91.11 (C)
(5)

(1993);

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-201

(1994) .
107Associated Press, Computer Porn Trial Breaking New

Ground '73 Community Standards Ruling Mav Get Stern Test, as
reported in Sun Sentinel (FL), Palm Beach Edition, Thursday
July 21, 1994, at 4A.
108Computer Porn, supra note 41.
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"dirty" cybersites,109 much like cable television allows
the blocking out of adult channels.

Several companies now

offer software to enabling parents to exercise control over
what on-line topics are accessible to their children.110
In addition, nearly all of the major servers such as America
On-Line have built-in parental control features.
109See. e.g., Lawrence Magid, Sen. Exon's Censors Are
Set a Little High for the Internet. Wash. Post, March 14,
1995, at F18.

Magid argues that the preservation of free

speech on the Internet is threatened by the Communications
Decency Act in the name of protecting children.

"I worry

that some overzealous prosecutor, anywhere in the country,
might use this law to go after a discussion of reproductive
rights, birth control abortion, gay rights, or any other
intensely debated subject."

Id.

Magid asserts that parents

"have other ways to protect their children," Id., from
obscenity on the Internet.

He refers concerned parents to

his booklet "Child Safety on the Information Superhighway,"
which is available through the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children.

Id.

110Such programs include "Cybersitter," which screens
words in context so that a question about the sex of an
individual would not be blocked, while a "lurid question"
would;

in addition, programs like "Surfwatch" now offer

parents the ability to block sites for violence.
Control Ware. Newsweek, February 12, 1996, at 12.

Parental
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Another potential answer is to have electronic boards
"rated" for obscene conduct as are video games, movies, and
musical releases.

This suggestion might be feasible for

boards that download images, but likely would not work on
discussion boards, which involve members from around the
world sharing their thoughts via the computer screen.
Operators of boards could caution users to keep their talk
within certain obscenity limits, but could not guarantee
their compliance.111
In sum, the question of juvenile access demonstrates
the dual nature of cyberspace as both a public and private
area.

Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged the

legitimate interests of states in regulating the
dissemination of obscene material when the method of
distribution "carries with it a significant danger of
offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of

lxlThere are differing approaches to control of messages
posted on electronic bulletin boards.
note 5 at § IV B 1.

See Schlachter, supra

Prodigy considers itself responsible

for its users' messages and thus has editorial discretion
not to print all submitted messages.

Id.

(citing Marianne

Taylor, Users Sav Computer Network is Muzzling Their Giveand-Take, Chi. Trib., Jan. 7, 1991, at Cl, quoting Martha
Griffin, Prodigy spokesperson).

CompuServe will remove

obscene or offensive messages if users complain.

Id.
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exposure to juveniles,1,112 cyberspace exists outside the
traditional public boundaries of local communities113 and
can be prevented from inadvertently affecting unwilling
viewers through technological controls.114

As the "public"

aspects of cyberspace are easily circumvented, one would
think that Americans would be willing to view it primarily
as a private area.

However, both the Thomas case and new

legislation indicate that as yet, our society is unwilling
to do s o .
112Miller. 413 U.S. 15 at 18-19.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969);
390 U.S. 629, 637-643
767, 769 (1967);

(1968);

See also Stanley v.
Ginsberg v. New York,

Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195

(1964) .
113,1 [N] ew problems in cyberspace will arise from the
fact that residents of cyberspace are also residents of
"real" spaces;

they will thus be members of two (or more)

different communities."

Hardy, supra note 4 at 1012.

114A1though these arguments make it seem increasingly
unreasonable to apply community standards on obscenity to a
medium which does not actually affect its community, courts
must keep in mind that the situation may have changed by the
time new regulations could be implemented.

Interactivity,

in particular, is beginning to characterize all forms of
electronic media, and the relative passivity of media
subscribers may not exist in the future.

A Cyberspace Standard for Obscenity:
The Communications Decency Act and Alternatives
Legislators soon recognized that it would be easiest to
regulate cyberspace through action at the federal level.
The Communications Decency Act of 1995 was one of several
proposals made in response to concerns over the de facto
application of community standards in cyberspace.

This

"anything goes,"115 standard, which resulted in very few
prosecutions, was too expansive for the liking of Senators
Jim Exon and Slade Gorton, backers of the Communications
Decency Act of 1995,116 signed into law on February 8, 1996
as a small part of an important telecommunications bill
supported by the Clinton administration.
Criminalizing "Indecent" Speech in Cyberspace
The Act modified the 1992 Communications Act117 to
allow criminal liability to be imposed on the transmitters
of computer messages which are "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent."118

The primary objectives of the

bill's sponsors are the protection of children from
115Steven Levy, Indecent Proposal:

Censor the N e t ,

Newsweek, April 3, 1995, at 53.
116S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
11747 USC § 223 (1992) .
118S. 314 at Sec. 223.
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(1995).

"pornography and smut," "computer stalking and inappropriate
contact with children."119

In addition, Representative

Henry Hyde, an opponent of abortion, added language which
applies the Comstock Act of 1873 to cyberspace, resulting in
a ban on discussions of abortion and birth control.120
The Act's passage touched off a storm of protest.
Thousands of World Wide Web site operators turned their
screen backgrounds black, the "cyberspace equivalent of book
burning," according to Jerrold Nadler, cyberspace user and
U.S. Representative.121

Over twenty groups filed suit in

federal court in Philadelphia, challenging the Act's
constitutionality.122

In New York, a district judge denied

requests for an order restraining the government from
enforcing the anti-abortion speech section of the Act after
"receiving assurances from the U.S. attorney that the
119See Jim Exon, We Can't Allow Smut on the Internet,
Wash. Post, March 9, 1995, at A2 0.
120Peter H. Lewis, Protest. Cvber-style, for New Law,
The New York Times, February 8, 1996, at A16.
121Id.
122Communications Decency Act 96;

First Wave of

Lashbacks, Online Libraries and Microcomputers, March 1,
1996.

The coalition includes, among others, the ACLU, the

Society of Professional Journalists, and the San Francisco
Bay Guardian.

Legal representation will be provided by the

First Amendment Project.
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government would not prosecute people who discuss abortion
on-line."

The judge pointed out that the Department of

Justice considers the Comstock law unconstitutional and has
not enforced it in twenty years.123

Kate Michelman,

president of the National Abortion rights Action League,
expressed her dissatisfaction with the judge's decision by
pointing out that such promises extend only through the end
of the Clinton administration, and that Americans "cannot be
subject to changing political winds on so critical a
matter.1,124
In addition, Senators Leahy and Feingold immediately
introduced a bill to repeal the Communications Decency Act.
Senator Feingold stated that the Act, "while wellintentioned, is improperly targeted at so-called 'indecent'
speech on the Internet which is protected by the First
Amendment."125

He pointed out that criminal statutes, like

the ones used to prosecute the Thomases, already served to
punish illegal distribution of obscenity.

The Senator

argued that the Act does nothing further "to protect
children on-line," while "compromis[ing]
^ Telecommunications;

the right of every

Judcre Rejects One Abortion-

Specific Suit, Abortion Report, February 9, 1996.
124Id.
125Russell Feingold, Senator, Senate, Leahy-Feingold
Bill Introduced to Repeal New Internet Censorship,
Congressional Press release, February 9, 1996.
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American to free speech."126
An Inappropriate Method
Further, critics charge that the Act fails to consider
the unique nature of communication in cyberspace, which can:
resemble postal mail, coffee klatsches, public
lectures, academic seminars, locker-room banter,
and print periodicals . . . [I]n none of these
venues would we welcome regulations where fines
and prison sentences would be doled out for
uttering certain expletives that, though once
considered scandalous, are now fairly ubiquitous
in our culture. . . if a magazine that commonly
runs some of those nasty words in its pages - say.
The New Yorker - decided to put its contents on
line, its leaders would be liable for a $100,000
fine and two years in jail.127
The variegated nature of cyberspace communications
emphasizes the unsuitability of the Communications Decency
Act as a regulator of potentially obscene speech on the
Internet.

Many of its goals could be met in ways that would

not so severely restrict freedom of speech in
cyberspace.128
If cyberspace must be policed for obscenity, almost any
other standard would be more appropriate than that provided
by the Communications Decency Act.

Another standard would

also have a better chance of surviving a constitutional

126Id.
127See Levy, supra note 115.
128See Ken E. Weine, The Communications Decency Act:
Too Deep, Too Broad, Too Much, N.Y. L. J., March 15, 1995 at
2.
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challenge;

the Act's criminalization of indecent speech in

cyberspace is prima facie unconstitutional as the Supreme
Court has emphatically declared that indecent speech merits
First Amendment protection.129

Additionally, the

technological feasibility and relative inexpensiveness of
software blocking devices emphasize that the sweeping taboos
of the Communications Decency Act are ridiculously broad.
As the Act has already elicited a number of legal
challenges, alternatives that can constitutionally regulate
obscenity in cyberspace while protecting "indecent" speech
merit discussion.
Legislative Options
Two existing bills may offer alternative legislative
options to the Communications Decency Act.

The "Protection

of Children from Computer Pornography Act of 1995" would
place criminal liability on any electronic bulletin board
operator who knowingly transmits indecent material to anyone
under the age of eighteen.130
and prison terms.

Penalties include both fines

Although this bill also addresses

indecent speech, it does so in a manner appropriate under
the current constitutional regime;

pornography is illegal

129See. e.g., FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978),
rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978);

Sable Communications

v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
130Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, Regulation of OnLine Services, N.Y.L.J., August 22, 1995, at 3.
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for sale to minors regardless of whether it is obscene or
indecent under local laws.

This would eliminate the problem

of determining what is obscene and what is indecent under
local community standards;

however, debate would be sure to

ensue about the definition of "pornography."
By contrast, the "Internet Freedom and Family
Empowerment Act" prohibits Internet regulation by the
Federal Communications Commission.

The bill creates a

national policy on use and development of the Internet,
which it praises as "an extraordinary advance in the
availability of educational and informational resources"
which "offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity."131
Moreover, the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment
Act fosters parental control over access to cyberspace and
encourages the development of parental control devices.

It

includes a "Good Samaritan" provision designed to allow
cyberspace users who already act to inhibit the distribution
of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable material"132 to
continue to do so.

This clause allows continued use of

obscenity control measures, such as those already in place
at the larger on-line service companies.
131Id.
132Id.

However, although
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this bill is friendly to Internet users and certainly
encourages the expansion of cyberspace, its adoption would
return us to basing on-line obscenity prosecutions on
community standards alone, as in the Thomas case.
Cyberspace As A Community
As an alternative to the community standards doctrine
has yet to be found, perhaps the simplest way to regulate
obscenity in cyberspace is to declare it a community all its
own.

Under current law, this would require that Internet

users determine a set of "community standards" which courts
could then apply to obscenity cases within the cyberspace
community as they would in any other locale.
Declaring cyberspace to be a community of its own is an
attractive option;

however, it is also a problematic one.

It is highly unlikely that a uniform "community standard"
could be agreed upon by users of the Internet, as there are
"differing interest groups all across cyberspace."133
main attraction

One

of the Internet, after all, is the

incredible variety of its user pool.

All sorts of people,

from all over the world, log on to the Internet to chat,
debate, and exchange ideas;

it is hardly fair to request

that such a diverse group make a decision which even the
Supreme Court found itself unable to articulate on a

133See Hardy, supra note 4 at 1013.
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national scale.134
134In addition, the question of to what degree Internet
users reasonably are subject to a particular court's
jurisdiction raises thorny problems.

Subscribers to on-line

systems are in effect possessed of "dual citizenship,11 in
cyberspace and in "real space."

Hardy, supra note 4.

Although prior court holdings have subjected people to
jurisdiction in areas to which they reached out, in those
cases the parties knew to what locality their actions were
directed.
(1985).

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
On-line subscribers do not necessarily know to what

geographic area their communications are directed;
accordingly, proprietors of bulletin board systems do not
necessarily know the origins of its subscriber base.
If the Internet were declared a community of its own,
the knotty issue of whether or not international users of
the network who violated the "community standard" could be
prosecuted under American obscenity laws is certain to
arise.

Fairness would seem to require a more direct attempt

to reach American markets before foreign subscribers could
be held liable for violations of American law.

See, e.g..

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102

(1987), 702 P. 2d 543

(1986), 39 C a l . 3d 35 (1986).

There is the additional question of how willing other
nations would be to assist the United States in such
adjudications against its citizens.
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Overturning Miller
The difficulties involved in applying existing
obscenity law to cyberspace demonstrate the more general
failings of the "community standards" doctrine as it applies
to America as a whole.

As one commentator has noted, the

idea of "culturally distinct geographical locations may
simply be obsolete in this age of cyberspace."135

For that

reason, overturning Miller and adopting a clearer definition
of what is obscene for use in all media is an attractive
option.

Ideally, a new obscenity regime would accommodate

the expansion and development of new technologies and would
broadly define obscenity to allow room for speech that
society values, such as political debate over abortion now
technically illegal in cyberspace.

A new national standard

for obscenity and indecency could include reasonable
controls on speech designed to limit access to children.
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, it seems
unlikely that we will ever be willing to abandon regulation
of obscene and indecent speech.

In the companion case to

Miller, Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton,136 the Court
For these reasons, some commentators have advocated the
creation of "cybercourts," which could act as a "virtual
forum" for the adjudication of disputes worldwide. See
Resnick, supra note 4 at Al.
135A11 Things Considered, supra note 103.
136413 U.S. 49 (1973) .
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acknowledged that:

" [T]here are legitimate state interests

at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity
...

[t]hese include the interests of the public in the

quality of life and the total community environment, the
tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly,
the public safety itself."137

And in the years prior to

Miller, Chief Justice Warren wrote that there is a "right of
the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society,"
which must be balanced against "the right of individuals to
express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 138
Efforts to balance concern over the quality of life and
the right of individual expression have given rise to
suggestions of obscenity regulation like the "Plain Brown
Wrapper Principle."
The Plain Brown Wrapper Principle is this: The
government may not prohibit the free trade of
obscene or indecent speech in the general
marketplace, but it may require that all obscene
or indecent speech be packaged and disseminated in
a manner that substantially diminishes exposure to
such speech to children or involuntary exposure to
such speech in genuine captive audience

137Id. at 57-58.
138 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)(Warren,
C.J., dissenting).
U.S. 413, 457

See also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383

(1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting);

v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57
336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949).

(1952);

Beauharnais

Kovacs v. Cooper,
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situations.139
Such theories seem far better equipped than the Miller
standard to keep in equipoise both one's right of free
expression and one's right to avoid the free expression of
others.

Use of a "Plain Brown Wrapper Principle" on-line

would encourage the employment of cyberspace's own
technology to weed out whatever users did not wish to see,
while still permitting the open exchange the medium makes
possible.140

139Smolla, supra note 40 at 330.
140Smolla/ supra note 40 at 330-334.

Conclusion
One legal commentator of a historical bent has noted
that "the Internet's Jeffersonian beginnings are already
spawning a Hamiltonian backlash.1,141

Many Americans

consider the explosion of electronic communications a modern
example of the truth of Jefferson's observation that "free
communication among the people ...
guardian of every other right."142

[is] the only effective
Others, however,

consider cyberspace a hotbed of "public licentiousness,"
agreeing with Hamilton's view on the dangers of "danc[ing]
to the tune of liberty without law."143

As these

factions struggle to decide how we will regulate obscenity
in cyberspace, its new technologies are stretching our
"legal creativity"144 to the limit.
As a place with both public and private aspects,
cyberspace is perhaps the ideal arena in which to experiment
with new ideas about ways to control obscenity and indecency
in media.

Further, as it seems unlikely that the harsh

strictures of the Communications Decency Act will survive
judicial scrutiny, an alternative means of regulation will
be needed to preserve free speech in cyberspace.

It will be

141David Post, New Rules for the 'Net?, The American
Lawyer, July August 1995, at 112.
142Id.
143Id.
144Waggoner, supra note 4.
50
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a challenging prospect, but the First Amendment has
accommodated new technologies before, and there is every
reason to believe that it will again.
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